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ABSTRACT
How should agencies and legislatures evaluate possible policies
to mitigate the impacts of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other
natural hazards? In particular, should governmental bodies adopt the
sorts of policy-analytic and risk assessment techniques that are widely
used in the area of environmental hazards (chemical toxins and
radiation)? Environmental hazards policy analysis regularly employs
proxy tests, in particular tests of technological “feasibility,” rather
than focusing on a policy’s impact on well-being. When human
welfare does enter the analysis, particular aspects of well-being, such
as health and safety, are often given priority over others. “Individual
risk” tests and other features of environmental policy analysis
sometimes make policy choice fairly insensitive to the size of the
exposed population. Seemingly arbitrary numerical cutoffs, such as
the one-in-one million incremental risk level, help structure policy
evaluation. Risk assessment techniques are often deterministic rather
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than probabilistic, and in estimating point values often rely on
“conservative” rather than central-tendency estimates.
The Article argues that these sorts of features of environmental
policy analysis may be justifiable, but only on institutional grounds—
if they sufficiently reduce decision costs or bureaucratic error or
shirking—and should not be reflexively adopted by natural hazards
policymakers. Absent persuasive institutional justification, natural
hazards policy analysis should be welfare-focused, multidimensional,
and sensitive to population size, and natural hazards risk assessment
techniques should provide information suitable for policy-analytic
techniques of this sort.

INTRODUCTION
How should policy analysis for natural hazards be structured?
Academics have given relatively little systematic attention to this
question, by contrast with the question of structuring policy analysis
for so-called “environmental” hazards (that is, chemical toxins and
radiation).1 To be sure, scholarly literatures focusing on risk
assessment and management of certain specific natural hazards are
well-developed—consider the literatures on flood, hurricane, and
seismic risks.2 But there is no general paradigm for natural hazards
risk assessment comparable to the overarching framework for
3
environmental risk assessment that the seminal Red Book (1983) put
in place. Since the publication of the Red Book, numerous
governmental commission reports and academic reports on

1. The term “environmental risk assessment,” by contrast with “ecological risk
assessment,” is often used to mean the assessment of health and safety risks posed by toxins and
radiation. Although this terminology is confusing, it is common in the risk assessment literature.
See Peter Calow, Environmental Risk Assessment and Management: The Whats, Whys and
Hows?, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1–2 (Peter
Calow ed., 1998). I therefore use “environmental” in this Article as pertaining to toxins and
radiation, and count FDA, OSHA, and NRC as well as EPA as “environmental” agencies.
2. See, e.g., FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES: INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT (Riccardo
Casale & Claudio Margottini eds., 1999); H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. AND THE
ENV’T, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF COASTAL HAZARDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
AND MITIGATION (2000) [hereinafter HIDDEN COSTS]; NAT’L INST. OF BLDG. SCIS.,
ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE ART EARTHQUAKE LOSS ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES
(1993). For a good summary of risk assessment models in these different areas, see Arleen A.
Hill & Susan L. Cutter, Methods for Determining Disaster Proneness, in AMERICAN
HAZARDSCAPES: THE REGIONALIZATION OF HAZARDS AND DISASTERS 13 (Susan L. Cutter
ed., 2001) [hereinafter AMERICAN HAZARDSCAPES].
3. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
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4
environmental risk assessment or management have appeared; the
counterpart literature, which treats natural hazards as a general
problem for policy analysis, is much smaller.5
Turning from academic work to governmental practice, there
certainly are agencies that have well-developed policy-analytic
protocols for addressing natural hazards—consider the guidance
documents for evaluating flood reduction measures that the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) has developed over the years.6 But
expertise in policy analysis varies widely among natural hazards
agencies. Compare ACE with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), which has only fairly recently begun to develop risk
7
assessment models. By contrast, all the leading federal agencies that
focus on chemical toxins and radiation—the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)—have
adopted risk assessment as a key component of their decisionmaking.8
It is interesting to speculate about the reasons for the differential
development of policy analysis in the environmental and natural
hazards bureaucracies. The reasons may be in part historical (the
happenstance of the Red Book’s publication), cultural (the culture of
science at EPA, and of toxicology at FDA, both of which were
receptive to risk assessment), or structural (the fact that natural
hazards policymaking is more highly devolved to the states than
environmental policymaking; for example, FEMA’s main tool for

4. Much of this literature is summarized and cited in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002).
5. An important exception is DENNIS S. MILETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN: A
REASSESSMENT OF NATURAL HAZARDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999).
6. See generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ANALYTICAL METHODS AND APPROACHES FOR
WATER RESOURCES PROJECT PLANNING (2004) (describing ACE practices); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW DIRECTIONS IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE U.S.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (1999) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES PLANNING] (same);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ANALYSIS AND UNCERTAINTY IN FLOOD DAMAGE
REDUCTION STUDIES (2000) [hereinafter FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES] (same).
7. See Robert V. Whitman et al., Development of a National Earthquake Loss Estimation
Methodology, 13 EARTHQUAKE SPECTRA 643 (1997); HAZUS: FEMA’s Software Program for
Estimating Potential Losses from Disasters, http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/index.shtm
(last visited Aug. 24, 2006).
8. See Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1148 n.91 (2005).
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hazards mitigation is the funding of state mitigation plans and
9
measures ).
In any event, academics and policymakers need to engage in
more sustained discussion about how to evaluate the threats that
natural hazards pose to human life, health, property, and other
human interests, and the desirability of governmental policies for
reducing those threats. Hurricane Katrina, with an estimated $100
billion in property damage and 1,330 fatalities, underscores the
importance of the discussion10—as does Katrina’s seismic counterpart,
the 1995 Kobe earthquake, with an estimated $115 billion in property
11
damage and 6,500 deaths. But the roughly $10 billion in annual
property and crop damage (to say nothing of indirect economic
effects) and hundreds of annual fatalities caused by seismic and
weather events in the U.S. in the years before Katrina should have
been sufficient indication of its importance.12
This Article aims to contribute to that discussion. The particular
strategy I adopt will be to draw from the U.S. experience with
environmental hazards policy analysis in suggesting cautionary
lessons for natural hazards policy analysis.
It is important to distinguish, at the outset, between policy
analysis and policy tools. Natural hazards policy tools are the various
kinds of interventions by which governmental bodies, federal or state,
can reduce the harms caused by earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, and other natural hazards. These include steps such as the
following:
• Constructing levees, floodwalls, and dams
• Incorporating provisions in building codes, for new
buildings, that reduce the risk of building collapse or other
damage in the event of earthquakes or hurricanes, or that
require structures in the floodplain to be sufficiently
elevated

9. See DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION: RECASTING
DISASTER POLICY AND PLANNING 11–16 (1999).
10. WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS
LEARNED 7–8 (2006).
11. See George Horwich, Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake, 48 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 521 (2000).
12. See Jerry T. Mitchell & Deborah S.K. Thomas, Trends in Disaster Losses, in
AMERICAN HAZARDSCAPES, supra note 2, at 77, 79–81.
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Reinforcing existing buildings to resist wind and ground
movement
• Relocating homes, commercial property, or infrastructure
away from floodplains and hurricane-prone coastal areas
• Limiting future construction in these areas through zoning
• Requiring individuals in high-risk areas to purchase
insurance, which may help induce them to take individual
mitigation measures
• Disseminating information about natural hazard risks and
countermeasures
• Temporarily evacuating individuals in advance of a specific
flood or hurricane
• Providing emergency food, medical care, shelter, and social
services to an area hit by an earthquake, flood, hurricane,
13
tornado, or other natural hazard.
By contrast, policy analysis means the application of some
decisionmaking technique for choosing among policy tools. Costbenefit analysis is one policy-analytic technique. A different
technique is to choose the policy that involves the lowest risk of
premature death for some individual (for example, the average
individual) from some particular risk source (for example, a particular
toxin or natural hazard). A third technique is to consider only policies
that are technologically “feasible” or “practicable,” and within this set
consider the policy that involves the lowest risk of premature death
for some individual from some particular risk source. This is an
illustrative, not exhaustive, list.
The chief policy tools for reducing the harms caused by chemical
toxins and radiation—for example, reducing industrial emissions of
air and water pollutants, requiring workers to wear protective gear,
cleaning up waste dumps, limiting the use of pesticides, or regulating
food additives—are, clearly, quite different from the policy tools for
reducing the harms caused by natural hazards. By contrast, policyanalytic techniques are (at least to some substantial extent)
translatable from the environmental to the natural hazards domain.
It is therefore natural to ask: what lessons can be drawn for the
(less developed) field of natural hazards policy analysis from the
(more developed) field of environmental policy analysis? This Article
addresses that question, focusing on major cautionary lessons. What
•

13.

See MILETI, supra note 5, at 155–240.
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are the recurrent features of existing environmental policy analysis
that are (or may well be) problematic, and that natural hazards
14
agencies should hesitate to incorporate into their choice procedures?
My focus on large and cautionary lessons is a heuristic device,
designed to structure the learning exercise. There are many
nonproblematic features of environmental policy analysis that natural
hazards agencies should duplicate, and many small mistakes that can
be avoided; but a list of all the lessons, positive and negative, large
and small, that can be gleaned from the history of policy analysis at
EPA, FDA, OSHA, and NRC would be overwhelming. I therefore
train my attention on the major cautionary lessons.
Some commentators are opposed to the very enterprise of
rigorous policy analysis.15 That is not my view. Environmental
agencies are to be applauded for developing a large and integrated set
of protocols for making a range of difficult policy decisions in the
teeth of great uncertainty. This is a genuine accomplishment in good
governance, which should be emulated by federal agencies such as
FEMA and ACE and by state agencies in California,16 Florida, and
elsewhere that address natural hazards. My heuristic focus on the
imperfections of the environmental agencies’ protocols is certainly
not meant to suggest that environmental policy analysis has generally
been a failure, or that natural hazards agencies should eschew the use
of systematic choice procedures.
Nontrivial normative advice about policy matters is invariably
somewhat controversial. I do not pretend that my recommendations
for policy analysis are robust across all plausible moral views.
Searching for a true “overlapping consensus,” here, is a quixotic
enterprise. On the other hand, giving useful advice does not entail
adopting some fully specified and therefore highly controversial
moral view. My general moral framework for this Article, one that I

14. I frame the question in terms of features of environmental policy analysis that “may
be” problematic, and that natural hazards agencies should hesitate to incorporate, because (as
shall emerge from the discussion below), the central lesson that emerges from a review of
environmental policy-analytic practice is a qualified one. Proxy criteria, criteria that give
especial weight to some aspect of well-being, and simplified techniques for risk assessment may
be justified, but only on institutional grounds. In particular, see infra text accompanying notes
36–39.
15. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1132 n.39 (citing sources).
16. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVS., STATE OF CALIFORNIA MULTI
HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN (2004), available at http://www.oes.ca.gov (follow “Hazard
Mitigation” hyperlink; then follow “State Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan” hyperlink).
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17
have adopted in other work, is “weak welfarism.” Weak welfarism is
a pluralistic framework that recognizes overall well-being as a morally
relevant consideration, but also allows for distributive considerations
and moral rights.
More precisely, weak welfarism says that the morally justifiable
choice in any governmental choice situation is a function of a possible
plurality of moral factors {W, F1, F2 . . . . . . FM}, where W is overall
well-being, and M > 0. Utilitarianism is a limiting case of weak
welfarism. Utilitarians insist that M = 0. But equity-regarding views
also fall under the rubric of weak welfarism. An equity-regarding
view has the structure {W, E, . . . }, where W is overall well-being and
E attends to the distribution of well-being, or of important
preconditions for well-being, such as income. Finally, “deontological”
views can be subsumed within this framework. These views posit
various moral rights—such as the right not to be killed, or perhaps the
right not to be put at risk of death—that constrain government’s
pursuit of overall well-being or the equalization of well-being.18
The framework of weak welfarism will generate prescriptions for
policy analysis that are relatively uncontroversial—prescriptions
which should be accepted by anyone holding a more specific moral
view subsumable within this framework.
The existing scholarship on environmental policymaking often
draws a sharp distinction between “risk management” (a somewhat
confusing term for what I am calling policy analysis) and “risk
19
assessment.” A policy-analytic technique structures governmental
officials’ deliberations. Risk assessment is not itself a policy-analytic
technique. Rather, it is a characterization of the effect of
environmental or natural hazards on human life or health, or other

17. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 25–61 (2006).
18. Weak welfarism also subsumes intrinsicalist environmental views, which see
environmental degradation as morally problematic independent of any effect on the well-being
of humans or other individual entities (such as certain animals) that possess a well-being. For
simplicity, I ignore intrinsicalist environmental views. Those views posit an environmental factor
F* that (by definition) is not sensitive to well-being. F* alone would not support the general
theme pressed in this Article: that policy analysis should, at some level, be welfare-focused,
attend to the plurality of welfare dimensions (multidimensionality), and be sensitive to
population size. Still, it is implausible that F* would be the sole morally relevant factor. A
plausible specification of weak welfarism would surely include overall well-being, equity, or
rights along with F*; and those constructs do support the general theme, as fleshed out below.
19. See, e.g., Dennis J. Paustenbach, Primer on Human and Environmental Risk
Assessment, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 5–7.
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human interests, which functions as an input to certain policy-analytic
techniques. Cost-benefit analysis is a policy-analytic technique that
requires a risk assessment. By contrast, the procedure of reducing
toxins to the lowest level technologically feasible does not require a
risk assessment. This procedure necessitates a quantification of the
toxin levels associated with different policy choices, and a
determination of the feasibility of those levels, but it does not need to
quantify the deaths or death risks associated with the different
choices.
The structure of my analysis will track the standard distinction
between “risk management” and “risk assessment.” Part I of the
Article discusses policy analysis proper. Part II discusses risk
assessment. First, what are the major cautionary lessons for natural
hazards policy analysis that can be gleaned from the environmental
policy analogue? Second, what are the major cautionary lessons for
the practice of risk assessment?
I. POLICY ANALYSIS
20
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which governs certain air
pollutants, illustrates some of the major features of environmental
policy analysis as currently practiced in the U.S. EPA is required to
set an initial emissions level for covered pollutants by considering
technological feasibility as well as the cost of reducing emissions. At a
minimum, for new sources in a given source category, the emissions
level cannot be higher than “the emission control that is achieved in
practice by the best controlled similar source”; a minimum reduction
for existing sources is similarly set by reference to current pollution
control practices.21 Then, within a set period of time after the
establishment of this initial level, EPA is required to consider
establishing a lower level if the incremental lifetime cancer risk to the
maximally exposed individual exceeds one in one million (the “trigger
22
provision”).
Note how this structure for EPA decisionmaking prioritizes
safety over other human interests: it is a one in one million fatality
risk, not property damage or other nonsafety effects of pollution, that

20. Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000).
21. § 7412(d)(3). These are the requirements for “major” sources, as opposed to “area”
sources. See § 7412(d)(5).
22. For a more detailed discussion of section 112 of the Clean Air Act, see Adler, supra
note 8, at 1150–52, and the sources cited at 1150 n.96.
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is supposed to prompt EPA to consider revising the initial emissions
23
level. Note, too, how the structure incorporates a proxy test. EPA is
not told to set the emissions level by maximizing safety, or by
balancing all aspects of human well-being as per cost-benefit analysis;
instead, the test of technological feasibility (meaning, in this case,
both physical achievability and existing practices24) is an important
ingredient in determining how stringently the pollutant should be
regulated. Further, observe that the trigger provision in section 112
uses a non-zero numerical cutoff. Why a one in one million risk to the
maximally exposed individual? Why not a one in one hundred
thousand risk? Or a zero risk? Observe, finally, that section 112’s
trigger provision does not depend on the size of the population
exposed to the pollutant. The provision is defined in terms of the risk
to the maximally exposed individual, not the number of expected
deaths from the pollutant. Doubling or quadrupling the exposed
population will not affect whether the trigger provision comes into
play.25
Each of these aspects of section 112—the prioritization of safety,
the use of technology-based proxies, insensitivity to population size,
and the use of non-zero risk cutoffs—is widespread in environmental
policy. And each grounds a cautionary lesson for natural hazards
policymakers.

23. Technically, the trigger provision is embedded in a broader provision, § 7412(f)(2)(A),
that instructs EPA to revise the technology-based standards under § 7412(d) if necessary either
to “provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health” or “to prevent, taking into
consideration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant factors, an adverse environmental effect.”
However, this general provision is supplemented by the trigger provision, which provides a
more specific condition under which EPA is required to consider lowering the technology-based
limits and is defined solely in terms of safety—the risk to the maximally exposed individual.
§ 7412(f)(2)(A).
24. On the different meanings of technological feasibility, see ADLER & POSNER, supra
note 17, at 75, 91; see also infra text accompanying notes 50–52.
25. The trigger provision is not a substantive provision. If triggered, it requires EPA to
consider lowering the emission level; but section 112 does not clearly specify what substantive
test EPA should use at that point. EPA, in fact, employs a population-size-sensitive test. See
Adler, supra note 8, at 1151–52 & n.102; see also National Emission Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants for Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturing Industry, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,422, 34,428 (June 14, 2006). So section 112, as
interpreted by the EPA, has some elements that are population-size sensitive. But the trigger
provision itself is not.
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A. Do Not Give Priority to Safety or Any Particular Aspect of
26
Well-Being (AGIR)
Environmental policy analysis often prioritizes safety (longevity
and health) over other aspects of human well-being. The simplest
example is when the agency employs some kind of safetymaximization criterion, seeking to minimize the health and longevity
impacts of a particular toxin. Paradigm cases are the Delaney Clause,
which requires FDA to refrain from licensing carcinogenic food
additives, notwithstanding the nutritive or hedonic benefits of those
additives or, for that matter, their benefits in preventing diseases; the
general provision for additives, which demands that they be “safe”;27
and section 109 of the Clean Air Act, which requires EPA to issue
standards for certain major air pollutants at a level that “protect[s]
the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety,”
28
notwithstanding economic costs.
A different kind of prioritization occurs when the policy-analytic
technique hybridizes safety considerations with other considerations,
but does so in a way that gives especial weight to safety. For example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Act instructs OSHA to set a
standard for workplace toxins at a level which “most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of his
29
working life.” A standard way to read this provision is that OSHA
should maximize safety within the constraints of technical feasibility
30
and economic feasibility (in other words, not bankrupting firms).
Economic costs are not totally ignored by the test, but they come into
play only when large enough to trigger bankruptcy; safety is not the
sole consideration, since it is hedged by technical and economic
feasibility, but it is more important than economic costs.

26. “AGIR” stands for “absent good institutional reason.”
27. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1164–67 (describing FDA regulation of food and color
additives, including the Delaney Clause).
28. See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
30. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2005); Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746,
56,791 (Nov. 4, 1996).
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The fact that environmental policymakers regularly give priority
to safety over other human interests (either as a matter of statutory
requirement, as in the above examples, or as a matter of
administrative discretion) has been the focus of much scholarly
criticism—and indeed is worrying from the perspective of weak
welfarism. Human well-being is multidimensional. Martha Nussbaum
has defended a plausible list of intrinsic human interests, the basic
constituents of human welfare, which runs as follows:
• life
• bodily health
• bodily integrity
• senses, imagination and thought
• emotions
• practical reason
• affiliation
• other species
• play
31
• control over one’s environment
Of course, one might quarrel with the details of Professor
Nussbaum’s list, and indeed there are various competitor lists in the
philosophical literature;32 but no plausible list counts longevity and
health as the sole human interests, or as interests that have a
categorical (“lexical”) priority over others.
The multidimensionality of human well-being means, first, that
policy-analytic techniques designed to identify policies which
maximize overall well-being should not (bracketing institutional
considerations) give special priority to safety. And, indeed, costbenefit analysis—the standard such technique—incorporates no such
priority.
This point is not surprising. More surprising, perhaps, is the claim
that distributive considerations, too, are multidimensional.
Egalitarian moral theory remains quite controversial. There are
continuing disagreements about (1) the “currency” for equity (should
government aim to equalize welfare, or rather to equalize individuals’
“holdings” of certain resources that are preconditions for welfare,
such as income); (2) the structure of the equity measure, namely

31. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78–80 (2000).
32. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 31–32.
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whether it focuses on raising individuals above some low level of wellbeing or resources, or instead is concerned about the overall pattern
of well-being or resources throughout the population; and (3) the
application of equity measures under conditions of uncertainty,
namely whether government should seek to equalize actual resources
or well-being, or instead to equalize individuals’ expectations of
33
resources or well-being. But all of the plausible possibilities are
sensitive to the multiplicity of human interests represented on a list
such as Professor Nussbaum’s. No plausible permutation would
suggest that equality merely demands the equalization of safety or
safety risks.
Finally, policymakers who attend to moral rights also ought to
engage in a kind of multidimensional analysis (bracketing
institutional considerations).34 Preliminarily—a point that will be
repeated below—it should be stressed that government does not
violate moral rights merely by failing to mitigate a natural hazard that
causes serious welfare setbacks. If I am a competent adult who
listened to and understood the weather forecast and chose to remain
in the path of a hurricane, suffering grave injury as a result, then
government’s failure to force or induce me to evacuate did not violate
my moral rights. However, there may well be some governmental
choices regarding natural hazards that deontologists would see as
rights-violating—for example, setting up a poorly constructed or
inadequate levee, which is described to residents as protective but
fails or is overtopped and harms some of them.
The point I wish to make here is that the subset of harmful
governmental choices that are rights-violating will not be limited to a
particular aspect of welfare. One sometimes gets the sense from the
environmental literature that the only genuine moral rights are rights
to bodily integrity. Sophisticated deontologists would reject that view.
I violate your rights by punching you or by stealing your car.
33. See Matthew D. Adler, Equity Analysis and Natural Hazards Policy, in ON RISK AND
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 129 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006);
Matthew D. Adler & Chris William Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty: Theory and Legal
Applications, 155 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006).
34. It is plausible to think that there is a tight linkage between moral rights and
“deontological” constraints or duties—namely, that P’s moral right is correlative to a
deontological duty that Q owes to P, such as a duty not to kill P or impose a risk on P—and for
purposes of this Article I use the notions of moral rights and deontological constraints
interchangeably. For a discussion of deontological constraints on killing and risking, and
citations to the literature on moral rights and deontological constraints, see Adler, supra note 8
at 1223–32.
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Similarly, government’s construction of a bad levee that ends up
killing individuals and destroying many homes violates both moral
rights to life and moral rights to property.
It has been suggested to me that safety is not really a single
dimension of well-being—in the way that, say, play or recreation is—
because being alive is a precondition for realizing any dimension of
well-being.35 Consider Professor Nussbaum’s list. One can have
friends (the good of affiliation), have a vibrant emotional life
(emotions), develop and realize goals (practical reason), and so on,
without engaging in play; but one cannot do any of these things
without being alive. But this way of looking at things makes giving
priority to safety seem yet more arbitrary. Imagine that the
dimensions of well-being are {V1 . . . . . . VN} and longevity is seen, not
as a separate dimension, but as a general precondition for realizing
any of the Vi. Consider, now, a policy-analytic test that tells the
policymaker to maximize longevity rather than engage in cost-benefit
analysis. In effect, this tells the policymaker to consider changes to
each Vi that occur in a certain way (through a change in an
individual’s longevity), but not changes that occur in other ways (by
changing enjoyment, recreation, friendship, consumption and so on
without changing longevity). The longevity-maximization test
therefore draws a (seemingly) arbitrary distinction between the
different modalities by which an individual’s attainment of the various
Vi can change.
So is there any way to justify safety-prioritizing policy-analytic
tests such as those put in place by the Delaney Clause, the food
additive licensing provisions, section 109 of the Clean Air Act, or the
OSHA toxins provision? Given the multidimensionality of welfare,
and therewith the moral constructs that figure in weak welfarism—
overall well-being, equity, moral rights—is there any way to justify
the widespread use by environmental decisionmakers of decision
procedures that give special priority to safety? The answer is yes.
Institutional considerations may perhaps warrant safety-prioritizing
procedures. Bureaucrats are not cognitively perfect or perfectly lawabiding; they cannot be expected to implement the policy-analytic
criteria assigned to them with zero decision costs (direct and delay
costs) and zero error rate.36
35. Thanks to David Driesen for pressing me to consider this point.
36. On the importance of institutional considerations in structuring administrative decision
procedures, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 62–123.
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Consider the construct of overall well-being. It is possible that a
provision which instructs an environmental agency to set pollution
levels using a safety-maximization criterion is a better way to
implement the criterion of overall well-being than a provision
instructing the agency to set pollution levels using cost-benefit
analysis. Why? The safety-maximization criterion has some (albeit
37
quite imperfect) correlation with the construct of overall well-being.
Safety-maximizing projects are likelier to increase overall well-being
than projects identified through a coin flip. Further, although the
cost-benefit criterion is better correlated with overall well-being, costbenefit analysis may have higher decision costs, and/or be associated
with a higher rate of bureaucratic error, than safety maximization.
Cost-benefit analysis may be more expensive in terms of direct costs
(meaning analysts’ wages, contractors’ fees, computer time, and the
cost of securing information for the analysis). It may tend to take
longer than safety-maximization, and therefore delay the
implementation of beneficial policies more than safety maximization
does. It could have a higher error rate38 than safety maximization—
because well-intentioned bureaucrats are more likely to make
mistakes in their application of cost-benefit analysis than in their
application of the safety-maximization criterion; or because the
application of cost-benefit analysis by the agency is more difficult for
the agency’s political overseers to monitor, making it easier for
bureaucrats to advance their own (non-welfare-maximizing)
preferences under the pretense of performing cost-benefit analysis.
Considering both the correlation of the cost-benefit criterion and the
safety-maximization criterion with overall well-being, and the
decision costs and error rates associated with the two criteria, it could
be the case that instructing some environmental agency to employ
safety-maximization is actually better, in terms of overall well-being,
than instructing the agency to employ cost-benefit analysis.
For short, I will call this kind of argument for a policy-analytic
criterion an “institutional” argument (because it attends to the actual
results of directing governmental officials to follow some policyanalytic criterion, given how governmental institutions actually work).

37. See id. at 91–95.
38. By error rate, I mean the rate at which the criterion assigned to bureaucrats (in this
example, the cost-benefit criterion or the safety maximization criterion) is incorrectly applied. A
criterion with zero error rate may, of course, still be inadvisable, if it is too poorly correlated
with the underlying moral considerations such as overall well-being.
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In point of fact, I very much doubt that institutional considerations do
make safety-prioritizing procedures a better mechanism for advancing
39
overall well-being than cost-benefit analysis. But this is an empirical
question, having to do with the capacities and motivations of agency
staff and overseers.
Whatever the answer to that question, one can draw the
following cautionary lesson from environmental policy analysis:
namely, natural hazards agencies should not arbitrarily give high
priority to certain aspects of well-being over others. A policy-analytic
technique that gives especial priority to safety, or some other human
interest, is unjustified unless alternative, multidimensional procedures
are actually a poorer way to implement weak welfarism, given the
high decision costs and/or rate of bureaucratic error associated with
these multidimensional techniques. Notably, the literature on
environmental policymaking fails to provide this sort of institutional
defense of prioritizing safety.
A second point: the institutional grounds for administrative
procedures that give special priority to some aspect of well-being
simply shift the locus of multidimensional policy analysis. A
multidimensional analysis should still occur at some point in the
governmental process. Perhaps high-level agency officials issue a
directive instructing lower-level staff to employ unidimensional (e.g.,
safety-focused) analytic criteria in making some class of decisions.
But then, presumably, the high-level officials should engage in some
sort of multidimensional analysis to determine whether the
unidimensional procedure tracks overall well-being, equity, or moral
rights—all multidimensional constructs—sufficiently well. Or perhaps
we are to imagine Congress instructing agency officials, at all levels,
to employ the unidimensional criterion. But then Congress should

39. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 62–123. The reader might wonder how the
view generally adopted in this Article, which entertains the possibility of institutional
justifications for policy-analytic criteria that give priority to a particular aspect of well-being
(such as safety), or that are proxy criteria rather than focusing on well-being, is consistent with
the defense of cost-benefit analysis that Eric Posner and I present in NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 17, and other work. The answer is twofold. First, and
most importantly, our defense of cost-benefit analysis rests in part on empirical claims, about
how cost-benefit actually works in institutions; in this Article I mean to bracket those empirical
issues, and provide recommendations for natural hazards policy that can be accepted even by
those who dispute our empirical claims. Second, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS recommends that cost-benefit analysis be used for large policy choices, and leaves
open the question whether other criteria (with lower decision costs) would be appropriate for
smaller decisions. See id. at 83, 186.
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itself undertake a multidimensional analysis, or at least consult an
expert commission about how to structure the agency’s
decisionmaking. Before the commission can properly advise Congress
to require the agency to focus on safety (for example), it ought to
consider both the safety and non-safety components of overall wellbeing, equity, and moral rights and determine that, given decision
costs and bureaucratic error, a safety-focused procedure is the best
way to implement these multidimensional moral constructs.
How relevant are these observations about multidimensionality
to natural hazards policy analysis? To begin, it is quite obviously true
as an empirical matter that natural hazards not only kill or injure
humans, but produce a variety of other sorts of welfare setbacks.
They cause property damage, business interruptions, and resultant
losses of wealth. Beyond that, they produce temporary or even
protracted homelessness, psychological trauma, unemployment (often
coupled with distress, anxiety, or anger), the disruption of families
and communities, the interruption of schooling, and the destruction of
cultural heritage.40 Further, even if the causal impact of some
particular type of natural hazard were somehow confined to welfare
dimension V*—even if, somehow, the hazard simply caused physical
injury, or psychological trauma—the effect of a policy intervention to
mitigate the hazard would involve governmental or private
expenditures, which would ramify along dimensions other than V*.
Natural hazards decisionmakers, like their environmental
counterparts, do sometimes employ choice criteria that give special
priority to certain aspects of well-being. The clearest example is
ACE’s procedures for determining whether and how to build flood
control structures, such as levees and floodwalls. ACE has for many
years relied on cost-benefit analysis as its central criterion for making
41
these decisions. However, this is a truncated kind of cost-benefit
analysis. ACE has traditionally included economic costs and benefits

40. See HIDDEN COSTS, supra note 2, at 45–104; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS: A FRAMEWORK FOR LOSS ESTIMATION (1999); Charles W.
Howe & Harold C. Cochrane, Guidelines for the Uniform Definition, Identification, and
Measurement of Economic Damages from Natural Hazard Events, in ECONOMICS AND THE
WIND 159 (Bradley T. Ewing et al. eds., 2005).
41. On ACE’s decisionmaking procedures, see generally sources cited supra note 6. I say
“as its central criterion” because ACE’s ultimate decisions are a mix of cost-benefit analysis and
other factors—for example, building beyond the height identified by cost-benefit analysis, up to
the one hundred-year flood, for levee certification purposes. See infra text accompanying notes
53–55, 81.
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in the analysis—the cost of building the structure, the benefit of the
structure in reducing property damage to buildings and contents
42
caused by inundation—but not safety or most ecological effects.
This is not to say that noneconomic factors are completely
ignored. For example, ecological effects have traditionally been
considered by ACE as a constraint on the maximization of economic
benefits.43 But the agency’s practice has been to refrain from
monetizing safety and most ecological effects and incorporating these
impacts in its cost-benefit analyses of flood reduction measures. So
there is an inversion from the environmental case, in which regulators
often give priority to safety over economic costs.
It is hard to see what the institutional justification for ACE’s
truncated cost-benefit analysis would be. Consider safety benefits.
The marginal decision costs of predicting both the safety and
economic benefits of flood control structures, rather than simply the
economic benefits, would seem to be low. Further, given that there
are now well-accepted techniques for pricing safety, employed by
environmental agencies in those instances when they do engage in
cost-benefit analysis,44 it is not clear why adding safety to the list of
monetized impacts would substantially increase bureaucratic shirking
or error by ACE staff. To be sure, decisions about how to build flood
control structures may typically have a small effect on the sheer
number of flood fatalities and injuries, because the government can
warn and evacuate in advance of a flood.45 However, the warn-andevacuate strategy is not perfect at preventing fatalities and injuries (as
Katrina evidences) and the overall welfare value of saving even a
single life is large. Thus information about safety impacts, which can
be incorporated in ACE’s cost-benefit analysis at low marginal
decision costs, would seem to be worth incorporating.
What about the valuation of ecological effects? Here, ACE is on
slightly firmer ground. Many applied economists believe that “non-

42. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 53–55, 60; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
RIVER BASINS AND COASTAL SYSTEMS PLANNING WITHIN THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS 95–98 (2004). I say that ACE has refrained from monetizing “most” ecological
effects because it does monetize recreational values. See WATER RESOURCES PLANNING, supra
note 6, at 67–70.
43. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 61.
44. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1197–98.
45. Thanks to Jason Johnston for this important observation—one that has also been
made, independently, by Lester Lave and Tunde Balvanyos. See Lester B. Lave & Tunde
Balvanyos, Risk Analysis and Management of Dam Safety, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 455, 458 (1998).
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use” values should be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis, but I have
46
argued elsewhere that this position is incorrect. I will not repeat the
analysis here. Suffice it to say that cost-benefit analysis is a procedure
for determining which policies increase overall well-being, and that
willingness-to-pay amounts that are grounded in disinterested rather
than self-interested preferences should therefore be screened out by
the cost-benefit analyst. In the area of ecological valuation, this
means screening out non-use values. On the other hand, it is hard to
see why ACE would be justified in excluding use values from its costbenefit analyses—namely, changes to the well-being of those who
physically interact with (“use”) some ecological resource, including
recreational values such as hunting, fishing, boating, hiking, and
camping; the benefits of clean, potable water and good visibility;
scenic values; and so on. There is now a large literature in ecological
economics on monetizing use values,47 and so the decision and
manipulability costs of incorporating these in ACE’s cost-benefit
procedure would seem to be lower than the benefit (in more
accurately identifying welfare-maximizing flood control projects).
Ultimately, whether ACE should monetize safety effects or
ecological use values along with economic costs and benefits
implicates empirical questions—about how different variants of costbenefit analysis would actually operate at ACE—that I can hardly
resolve in this Article. The critical point, for my purposes here, is a
more general one: well-being is multidimensional; the moral
constructs of overall well-being, equity, and rights are also
multidimensional; therefore, an administrative decision procedure
which gives priority to one aspect of well-being or a proper subset of
its aspects is suspect. Such a procedure should be critically scrutinized
by agency overseers and academics, and should be rejected absent a
persuasive institutional justification for the procedure—one that
compares the procedure to alternative, multidimensional procedures
in terms of decision costs, bureaucratic error rates, and correlation
with underlying moral constructs.

46. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 133–36; Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A
Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006).
47. For reviews of ecological cost-benefit analysis, including use values, see A. MYRICK
FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE VALUES: THEORY
AND METHODS (2d ed. 2003); A PRIMER ON NONMARKET VALUATION (Patricia A. Champ et
al. eds., 2003); Maureen L. Cropper, Has Economic Research Answered the Needs of
Environmental Policy?, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 328 (2000).
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B. Do Not Use Proxy Tests (AGIR)
Technology-based policy analysis is widely used in environmental
law. A preliminary word of clarification: sometimes, environmental
regulations are divided into “command and control” regulations,
which require firms to use specified technologies, and “performance”
regulations, which demand a certain level of emissions reduction
without specifying how to achieve that reduction. This distinction is
not the one I mean to draw here. My interest, again, is in
characterizing governmental choice procedures, not in differentiating
the various kinds of primary obligations that government might
impose on private individuals.
Technology-based policy analysis uses technological criteria as
part of the recipe for governmental choice. In the case of
environmental policy, technology-based policy analysis tends to focus
48
on “feasible” or “available” technology. Sometimes, technological
considerations displace safety considerations as the main
policymaking criterion. The provision in Clean Air Act section 112
governing initial emissions limits has this form; EPA, in setting these
limits, is instructed to consider technical feasibility as well as cost, but
not safety.49 Sometimes, technological criteria are hybridized with
safety or other considerations, as in the case of OSHA’s toxins
provision, where technological feasibility functions as a constraint on
the maximization of safety benefits.
Technological availability or feasibility might be a matter of what
is physically possible, given current science and engineering, or rather
a matter of norms and practices among some group of actors.50 It is
hard to imagine the first sort of approach having much role in natural
hazards policy analysis. Consider levee design: the largest physically
possible levee would be hundreds of feet high and massively thick and
strong. Surely ACE should (always!) stop well short of this point in
building its levees. “Physical possibility” as a goal in levee design
would be absurd, and as a putative constraint would be no constraint
at all. Parallel points could be made about the construction of hazard-

48. See Driesen, supra note 30.
49. “These emission standards are to be based not on an assessment of the risks posed by
[hazardous air pollutants], but instead on the maximum achievable control technology . . . for
sources in each category.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 353 F.3d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2004). As explained
above, after EPA sets these initial limits, it must eventually consider setting lower limits, and at
that stage does consider safety. See supra text accompanying notes 20–25.
50. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 17, at 75, 91.
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resistant buildings and structures—both ordinary residential and
commercial property and more critical infrastructure. The strongest
physically possible building would be absurdly expensive. Technology
also comes into play in warnings and evacuations. It is technologically
possible to evacuate everyone from Florida and the Gulf Coast for all
of hurricane season, or to send a government representative to warn
51
every household in person. But these are not serious policy
proposals.
Technological availability in the second, norms and practices
sense, is more thinkable. For example, seismic codes could be
specified with reference to current building practices. New
construction could be required to be as protective as some percentile
of existing construction.52
A different sort of technology-based approach to policy analysis,
exemplified by ACE practices, employs specific technological rules of
thumb. Until the 1990s, ACE traditionally “added 3 feet of freeboard
to the design height of its levees, a principle that became a staple of
Corps flood damage reduction studies and projects.”53 This three-feetof-freeboard rule was, in particular, used when ACE built levees to
withstand a one hundred-year flood, rather than to maximize net
benefits—which occurred when local communities were willing to
subsidize the additional levee construction costs needed to reach the
one hundred-year mark, so that the area protected by the levee would
not be counted as part of the one hundred-year floodplain for
purposes of the National Flood Insurance Program.54 Adding three
feet was “a measure to prevent overtopping caused by higher
water . . . than was forecast for the design flood, as some uncertainties
may not have been explicitly considered.”55
Closely related to technology-based policy analysis, and an
important tool in current natural hazards decisionmaking, is
56
reliability-based analysis. An excellent example is the approach used

51. See, e.g., Roger Pielke, Jr. & R.E. Carbone, Weather Impacts, Forecasts, and Policy: An
Integrated Perspective, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, Mar. 2002, at 393 (discussing costs
of overwarning about hurricanes and other adverse weather impacts).
52. See Bruce R. Ellingwood, Earthquake Risk Assessment of Building Structures, 74
RELIABILITY ENGINEERING & SYS. SAFETY 251, 256 (2001).
53. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 13. See generally id. at 139–58.
54. See infra note 81.
55. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 13.
56. In general, reliability-based tests for structures might be framed as: “Use all feasible
technology to ensure that the structure performs function F except in extreme event E,” where
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by governmental or quasi-governmental bodies in drafting seismic
57
building codes. These bodies typically aim to write codes that will
avoid building collapse in the event of any nonextreme earthquake
(for example, any earthquake smaller than the 475-year
earthquake).58 The decisional criterion employed by the code drafters
is “prevent building collapse in nonextreme earthquakes” rather than
“maximize net benefits, including both economic and safety impacts”
or “maximize safety benefits.” A similar approach has been
traditionally used in designing dams, specifically in deciding how low
the risk of dam failure (collapse or overtopping) should be. The goal
has traditionally been to design the dam so that it will not fail except
in an extreme precipitation event.59 The criterion, here, is “construct
the dam so that it will not fail during nonextreme rainfalls” rather
than “maximize net benefits,” defined inclusively or narrowly.
To sum up: a variety of proxy tests are currently used, or might
conceivably be used, by environmental and natural hazards
decisionmakers. These are proxy tests insofar as they focus the
decisionmaker’s attention on some feature of available choices other
than their impact on well-being or some of its dimensions. Proxy tests
might be technology-based tests (of various kinds), or, a close cousin,
reliability tests. Or they might take some other form.
All this is descriptive. But are proxy tests an appropriate policyanalytic tool for environmental or natural hazard regulators? The
answer should have a familiar ring: proxy tests are justifiable, if at all,
on institutional grounds. And even if proxy tests are justified, their
use by administrative agencies simply shifts the locus of welfarefocused, (non-proxy-based) decisionmaking within the governmental
process.

F might be not collapsing (in the case of a building), remaining passable (in the case of a bridge
or roadway), generating electricity (in the case of a power plant), and so on.
57. On seismic codes, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, REDUCING
EARTHQUAKE LOSSES (1995) [hereinafter REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES]; Ellingwood,
supra note 52.
58. See REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 78–79, 103–09; Julian J.
Bommer, Deterministic Vs. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment: An Exaggerated and
Obstructive Dichotomy, 6 J. EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 43, 60–61 (2002); Ellingwood, supra
note 52.
59. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS: FLOOD AND EARTHQUAKE
CRITERIA 8–60 (1985); Lave & Balvanyos, supra note 45; David A. Moser, Risk-Based Analysis
in Flood Damage Reduction Studies, in U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, HYDROLOGY &
HYDRAULICS WORKSHOP ON RISK-BASED ANALYSIS FOR FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION
STUDIES 1, 2–4 (1997).
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To begin, it is clear that proxy tests will, at some rate, select
suboptimal policies—policies that are worse than alternatives with
respect to overall welfare, equity, and rights. The critical literature on
technology-based tests in environmental law makes this point,
showing how a requirement that firms employ “feasible” pollutionreducing measures can lead to inefficient overregulation (if, for
example, small firms are required to employ high-fixed-cost
technologies) or underregulation (if it would be most efficient to
reduce pollution beyond the point that is technologically feasible
given continued production of the good, for example by shutting
down production entirely).60
Similar observations can be made about proxy-based criteria for
natural hazards policymaking. Consider ACE’s three-feet-offreeboard rule. The rule is meant to provide an extra margin of
protection for communities at risk of flooding. But the protection
provided by the rule varies from community to community. A recent
study by the National Research Council found that the annual
probability of flooding in communities protected by levees built to the
one hundred-year flood plus three feet of freeboard varied widely,
from one in ten thousand to one in one hundred.61 “[T]his fixedfreeboard approach provided inconsistent degrees of flood protection
to different communities and provided substantially different levels of
protection in different regions.”62
A similar point can be made about the incremental protection
provided by the three-feet-of-freeboard rule. Absent freeboard, the
community will have an annual probability p of flooding; after
freeboard, the community will have an annual probability q of
flooding. The difference between p and q depends on local hydrology
(the shape of the so-called flood-frequency curve) and local
hydraulics (the features of the channel in which the flood waters
flow). Finally, the variable incremental protection provided by the
three-feet-of-freeboard rule has no systematic connection to the
benefits of incremental protection—to the amount of property and
number of lives at risk.
Or consider the proxy test used to write seismic building codes:
ensure that buildings do not collapse except in extreme earthquakes.

60. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334–40 (1985).
61. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 144–45, 149–58.
62. Id. at 13.
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This maps, roughly, onto a safety-focused test, which says to construct
buildings to avoid fatalities except in extreme earthquakes—since
fatalities caused by building shaking in earthquakes mainly occur
63
when buildings collapse. But the mapping is not perfect, because
some damage to buildings short of collapse may cause fatalities (for
example, when ceilings or lights fall on occupants).64 Further, much
economic loss can occur when buildings are shaken without
collapsing: direct economic loss by virtue of damaged building
components, systems, or contents (which are expensive to replace),
indirect economic loss by virtue of business interruption, and other
indirect effects.
Recent experience . . . has shown that structural collapses,
although spectacular and newsworthy, are by no means the only
source of earthquake-related losses. Economic losses also stem from
business interruptions; loss of records and computer databases in the
service economy; . . . and widespread, noncatastrophic damage to
residential and commercial structures throughout the earthquake
region. . . . [One] estimate implies that catastrophic building failure,
which is what codes and retrofits are designed to prevent, will be
responsible for less than one-tenth of California’s future bill for
65
direct earthquake losses.

In short, “a code-complying building can ‘survive’ an earthquake (i.e.,
not collapse and kill people) and still end up a shambles inside and
out.”66 Weak welfarism surely does not require that all buildings be
reinforced to the point of suffering no damage at all in nonextreme
earthquakes. But presumably there is some such strengthening
beyond the point identified by the no-collapse proxy that would be
warranted—in particular, that would have welfare benefits exceeding
the costs of the additional strengthening.
Even though proxy-based tests pick out suboptimal policies at
some nonzero rate, instructing agencies to employ proxy tests can be
optimal if they are sufficiently accurate in tracking overall well-being,

63.
64.

See REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 72–73.
See CAL. SEISMIC SAFETY COMM’N, EARTHQUAKE RISK MANAGEMENT: MITIGATION
SUCCESS STORIES 17–20 (1999) (discussing program to reinforce ceiling lighting systems in Los
Angeles School District buildings, given the risk of injuries or fatalities if systems fell during an
earthquake).
65. REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 110.
66. Id. at 106. For a similar point about the losses in Hurricane Andrew from building
damage short of collapse, see MILETI, supra note 5, at 129.
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equity, and moral rights, and if the decision costs and rate of
bureaucratic error under alternative tests is sufficiently high. But is
this possibility in fact realized? In the domain of environmental
policy, the answer is difficult and contested, and may well depend on
context. Technology-based proxies may not require a risk
67
assessment, whereas a cost-benefit or safety-maximization procedure
will. So technology-based proxies may have lower decision costs. But,
given advances in computational speed, software, and data
availability, which facilitate risk assessment,68 the decision-cost gap,
here, is shrinking. Technology-based proxies may also be clearer in
their requirements, hence less manipulable by bureaucrats (or interest
groups). The shift from a safety-maximization approach to a
technology-based approach does seem to have revived the regulation
of air pollutants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.69 On the
other hand, FDA has long regulated food additives using risk
assessment, under the general requirement that food additives be
“safe.” It clearly has managed to evaluate numerous additives,
specifically by using a test that ensures that the “individual risk” to a
high-end (90th percentile) food consumer is below a “no observed
adverse effect level” (NOAEL) based threshold (for noncarcinogenic
toxins) or the threshold of a one-in-one million lifetime fatality risk
(for carcinogen-containing additives exempt from the Delaney
Clause).70 Although FDA has tried to evade the Delaney Clause,
finding various statutory loopholes to subject carcinogens to the one71
in-one million de minimis threshold instead, I am not aware of
evidence that the FDA has regularly subverted this safety threshold
or the parallel threshold for noncarcinogens to serve nonsafety goals.
67. By risk assessment, again, I mean a characterization of the impact of the natural hazard
on one or more aspects of well-being. A policy-analytic test that is framed purely in terms of
technology will not require a risk assessment, but a hybrid test that references both technology
and safety (or other aspect(s) of well-being) will.
68. See F. Bendimerad, Loss Estimation: A Powerful Tool for Risk Assessment and
Mitigation, 21 SOIL DYNAMICS & EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING 467 (2001); Michael E.
Hodgson & Susan L. Cutter, Mapping and the Spatial Analysis of Hazardscapes, in AMERICAN
HAZARDSCAPES, supra note 2, at 50–60; Jason K. Levy et al., Advances in Decision Support
Systems for Flood Disaster Management: Challenges and Opportunities, 21 WATER RESOURCES
DEV. 593 (2005).
69. See, e.g., David P. Novello, The Air Toxics Program at the Crossroads: From MACT to
Residual Risk, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57 (2004).
70. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1164–67.
71. See id. at 1165–67; Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause:
Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J.
ON REG. 1 (1988).
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Scholars need to think about proxy-based natural hazards tests in
similar terms—by looking to the decision costs and bureaucratic error
rates associated with these tests, as compared to alternative policyanalytic tests. In some cases, it will pretty clearly emerge that a proxybased test is unjustifiable. Consider ACE’s three-feet-of-freeboard
test, used as a factor to ensure that levees built to protect
communities from the one hundred-year flood are not overtopped.
Determining the flood elevation in a settled area that would occur in
the event of the one hundred-year flood entails a complicated,
quantitative, model-driven analysis by ACE. Why, then, use a safety
factor in calculating levee height, rather than directly calculating the
height that achieves some given level of protection (for example, a
five percent chance of being overtopped in the one hundred-year
flood)?72 It is very hard to see why the three-feet-of-freeboard rule
substantially lowers the decision costs of ACE decisionmaking, or
makes it less manipulable. By contrast, the use of no-collapse tests in
designing building codes plausibly has substantial institutional
advantages as opposed to, for example, cost-benefit analysis.
Determining the no-collapse level, by contrast with cost-benefit
analysis, does not require determining the lives saved or direct or
indirect economic costs avoided by various possible degrees of
building strength. So there is some apparent economy in terms of
decision and manipulability costs.
C. Do Not Ignore Population Size (AGIR)
A policy-analytic criterion is insensitive to population size when
it chooses a policy without reference to the number of individuals
harmed by, or exposed to, the environmental or natural hazard that
the policy is redressing.73 In the area of environmental and natural
72. An even more straightforward criterion would be that the levee must reduce the annual
probability of flooding in the protected area to one-in-one hundred. On these points, and the
subtle difference between the annual probability of flooding in the protected area (which looks
to the full range of possible floods that the levee might encounter) and the probability of
protection from the one hundred-year flood (which looks to the chance that the levee will be
overtopped by a flood of a particular magnitude, namely that magnitude the annual exceedance
probability of which is 1/100), see FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 139–
58.
73. Population-size sensitivity, as I define it, is a matter of the conceptual structure of
policy-analytic criteria. A criterion that will choose the same policy when the size of the exposed
population is varied, and everything else is held constant, is “population size insensitive.” In
practice, larger populations may correlate with other factors to which the criterion is sensitive.
For example, industries that affect larger populations may tend to develop more advanced
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hazards policy, this typically occurs in two ways. First, the agency
might employ a proxy test (such as a technology-based or reliabilitybased proxy) for selecting policies, specifically one that does not
attend to a policy’s efficacy with respect to safety, property,
psychological well-being, or the other dimensions of well-being
74
affected by natural hazards. Second, the agency might employ a
policy-analytic criterion that does focus on some or all of these
dimensions, but is structured in a population-size-insensitive way.
An environmental-policy example of the first, proxy-based
variant of population-size insensitivity would be a requirement that
the agency set emissions levels for new sources in each industrial
category at a level achievable by the best available technology, or by
the top quartile of polluters. This criterion makes no reference to the
safety impacts of a given industrial category’s emissions and, in
particular, to the number of individuals exposed to or killed by its
pollutants. Two industrial categories that emit pollutant X will be
required to reduce X to the same level even if one of the categories
has many more firms, and affects a much larger population, than the
other.
A natural-hazards example of the population-size insensitivity
that flows from a proxy test would be a reliability-based criterion for
designing structures which stipulates that the structure must not fail
except in a specified extreme event. Consider, for example, the
criterion that seismic codes should ensure that no building collapse
except in a 475-year earthquake. This criterion does not attend to
whether the building being strengthened will contain a few
individuals, a few dozens, hundreds, or thousands.
Population-size insensitivity of the second kind routinely occurs
in environmental law, by virtue of “individual risk” tests.75 These tests
characterize an environmental hazard’s safety impact by looking to
the incremental individual fatality risk borne by some individual in

technologies—something that a test of technological feasibility would attend to. Still, it is
important to distinguish between criteria that are structured so as to be attuned to population
size, and criteria whose application may simply have some correlation with population size.
Absent institutional considerations, our government’s policy-analytic criteria should have
population-size sensitivity built into them.
74. A hybrid test that both incorporates proxy considerations and attends to a hazard’s
well-being impact could be sensitive to population size—for example, “use all technologically
feasible measures to reduce emissions of the toxin, up to the point where the expected number
of deaths caused by the toxin is less than one.”
75. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1147–79.
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the exposure distribution, such as the average, maximally exposed, or
highly exposed (e.g., 90th percentile) individual, rather than to the
76
number of deaths caused by the hazard. For example, the EPA’s
rules for remedying hazardous waste sites under the Superfund
statute mandate that a site cleanup must occur whenever the
maximally exposed individual incurs an incremental lifetime fatality
risk exceeding one in ten thousand, and must bring his risk below that
level.77 This is true regardless of whether the site is in a remote or
settled area.78
“Individual risk” tests, although sometimes mooted in the
scholarly literature on natural hazards,79 seem not to have been
explicitly used by natural hazards regulators. But they have a very
close analogue in a criterion that is sometimes used in choosing
policies (such as building levees or floodwalls or evacuating residents)
to protect settled areas from floods and hurricanes. Call this the
“area-protection” criterion. It says that a policy must be chosen that
protects the settled area from all but extreme events (from all but the
one hundred-year flood, the one hundred-year hurricane, the
probable maximum flood, the probable maximum hurricane).
Although ACE’s current stated policy is not to use the areaprotection criterion in selecting its preferred projects, relying instead
on cost-benefit analysis,80 the area-protection criterion is important
under the National Flood Insurance Program81 and has been
76. An “individual risk” test could be structured in a population-size-sensitive fashion—for
example, minimize the number of individuals with an “individual risk” above some level.
However, “individual risk” tests currently employed in environmental policy are not generally
thus structured. Also, it should be clarified that “individual risk” tests are sometimes one
element in a broader decisionmaking procedure, where other components are population-size
sensitive, but the “individual risk” test itself is not—and that needs justification.
77. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1156–58.
78. EPA does have discretion in choosing the target “individual risk” for the remedy,
which can lie anywhere in the range from one in ten thousand to one in one million. It appears
that EPA gives little weight to the size of the population exposed to the waste site in exercising
this discretion. See id.
79. See, e.g., Edmund Penning-Rowsell et al., Estimating Injury and Loss of Life in Floods:
A Deterministic Framework, 36 NAT. HAZARDS 43 (2005).
80. See sources cited supra note 6; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PUB. NO. ER 1105-2-101,
PLANNING: RISK ANALYSIS FOR FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES 3–4 (2006), available at
http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-regs/er1105-2-101/entire.pdf.
81. More precisely, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) creates an incentive for
localities to pay the costs of constructing levees that will protect one hundred-year floodplains.
Removing an area from the one hundred-year floodplain means that buildings within the area
are no longer subject to the mandatory purchase of flood insurance, and that the community (if
it wants to continue participating in the NFIP, which provides subsidized insurance for certain
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82

employed in other contexts as well. In effect, the area-protection
criterion says that the annual risk of death or property damage to
anyone in the settled area must not exceed one in one hundred (if the

buildings within the one hundred-year floodplain) is no longer required to regulate construction
in the area in accordance with the NFIP. Because these incentives are stronger for communities
with more densely settled floodplains, the levee construction generated by the NFIP can be
expected to correlate with population size. On the NFIP, see Edward T. Pasterick, The National
Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE
AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J.
Roth, Sr. eds., 1998); RUTHERFORD H. PLATT, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS
OF EXTREME NATURAL EVENTS 28–33 (1999); FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra
note 6, at 139–47.
82. It appears that levees to protect cities have generally been built to withstand something
like the probable maximum flood.
Another magnitude of flood that can occur is one that results from the standard
project flood (SPF) discharge. This event is not assigned a frequency or recurrence
interval, although it is often used by hydrologic engineers to approximate the 0.2
percent annual chance (500-year) flood. The SPF discharge in a river represents the
flow that can be expected from the most severe combination of meteorologic and
hydrologic conditions reasonably characteristic of the geographic region involved . . . .
The SPF discharge is currently used for design of engineered structures, which, if
compromised, could result in catastrophic flooding. The SPF discharge is generally
used to determine the level of protection for urban population centers where there is
great threat of loss of life and of damage to critical infrastructure.
INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE:
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 60 (1994); see also id. at 70–72
(suggesting that the goal of floodplain management, for population centers and critical
infrastructure—but not in general—should be to reduce vulnerability from an SPF discharge);
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE AMERICAN RIVER BASIN
115 (1995). Note how a decision rule that says “build levees to protect cities from the probable
maximum flood” incorporates a crude kind of population-size sensitivity. It sorts settlements
into two categories—cities, i.e., settlements with large populations, versus other settlements—
but does not distinguish among cities with respect to population size.
It is notable that the urban portions of the New Orleans levee system were designed with
reference to the “Standard Project Hurricane”:
For [the] Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity [project] and [the] West Bank and Vicinity
[project], the Standard Project Hurricane (SPH) was selected as the design hurricane
because of the urban nature of the project area. The Standard Project Hurricane was
defined as a hypothetical hurricane intended to represent the most severe
combination of hurricane parameters that [was] reasonably characteristic of a
specified region.
3 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS AND
SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF THE
INTERAGENCY PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TASK FORCE, at III-12 (2006).
Finally, it should be noted the construct of the SPF or SPH is not, strictly, the same as that
of the probable maximum flood or hurricane. See id. at III-33 to III-35 (describing the SPH as
looking to the most severe meteorological conditions that are “reasonably characteristic” of the
region, whereas the probable maximum hurricane looks to the most severe combination that is
“reasonably possible”). That distinction is not material to my analysis here. Whether defined in
terms of the one hundred-year event, the standard project event, or the probable maximum
event, the area-protection criterion is population-size insensitive.
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one hundred-year cutoff is used) or zero (if the probable maximum
event is used), regardless of the number of individuals living in the
settled area or owning property there.
Should weak welfarists be troubled by policy-analytic criteria
that are insensitive to population size? I suggest that they should be.
A plausible case can be made that all the moral criteria subsumed
under weak welfarism are sensitive to population size.83 This is clearly
true of overall well-being. Increase the size of the population that
occupies some building, or that is endangered by a flood or hurricane,
and the expected benefit to overall welfare of strengthening the
building or constructing a protective levee increases as well.
It is also quite plausible that equity is sensitive to population size.
Demonstrating this in detail would require me to work through the
various plausible specifications of “equity”—comparative versus
noncomparative, ex ante versus ex post, welfare-based versus
resource-based. Because I lack space to do so, let me focus on the
particular specification that I have argued for elsewhere: namely that
“equity” above all means identifying “poverty lines” with respect to
different well-being dimensions, and reducing the extent to which
individuals fall below these lines.84 Clearly, this approach to equity is
population-size sensitive. Double the number of individuals expected
to suffer grave psychological trauma, or protracted homelessness or
unemployment, or income poverty, or death as a result of a structural
collapse, and the equity benefits of avoiding collapse increase.
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, a strong case can be made that
moral rights are population-size sensitive. Consider, first, the moral
right not to be wrongly killed—a moral right that all deontologists
85
accept. P wrongly kills Q if P causes Q’s death and further
conditions are satisfied (the nature of which is a matter of dispute
among deontologists). The point to see here is that the number of
people who will be killed, or wrongly killed, if some building collapses
or some community is hit by a flood or hurricane depends on the
number of individuals in the building or community. Now, it might be
objected that, because deontological rights are absolute, the number
of wrongful killings is irrelevant—government has an absolute duty to
prevent even one. But no one really believes this, at least when the

83.
84.
85.

See Adler, supra note 8, at 1240–46.
See Adler, supra note 33.
See Adler, supra note 8, at 1225–27.
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victims are not identified ex ante: who believes that government has
an absolute obligation to stop wrongful homicides? At least in the
case of unidentified victims, the weight of government’s deontological
reason to prevent the wrongful killings that would occur as a
consequence of natural hazards must be (in part) a function of the
expected number of such killings.
What if we supplement the right not to be killed with a right not
to be wrongly put at risk of death? On the first view, only those who
are actually killed by the structure’s collapse have their rights
violated; on the second, individuals who don’t die still might suffer
rights infringements, given the risk imposed on them. A deontologist
who adopts this latter view will need to specify the conditions under
which P’s action increasing Q’s risk of death is deontologically
86
wrongful. However those conditions are specified, it is surely not the
case that government has an absolute obligation to prevent wrongful
risk impositions—which would be even less plausible than the view
that it has an absolute obligation to prevent wrongful killings. At
most it has a defeasible deontological obligation to prevent wrongful
risk impositions, the strength of which presumably depends on the
number of individuals at risk.
If overall welfare, equity, and rights are sensitive to population
size, it follows that size-insensitive policy-analytic criteria are
justifiable only on institutional grounds.
It would seem that proxy tests can, sometimes, meet this burden
of justification. Proxy tests focus the decisionmaker on some feature
of policies other than well-being, and population-size insensitivity is
one consequence of this refocusing, but the refocusing may be
warranted, if the proxy test has sufficient advantages in terms of
decision costs and bureaucratic error. Still, it is important for agency
overseers and academics to be attentive to the disadvantages of proxy
tests, including population-size insensitivity. Note also that a proxy
test might incorporate administrable proxies for population size—for
example, using a more extreme earthquake in defining the no87
collapse criterion for large as opposed to small structures.

86. See id. at 1227–32.
87. Indeed, seismic codes typically do this. “[B]uilding codes distinguish in terms of
building use. In general, structures that serve critical functions (e.g., hospitals) or house large
numbers of people (e.g., schools) are held to a higher standard than are less important, more
thinly occupied buildings.” REDUCING EARTHQUAKE LOSSES, supra note 57, at 106.
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What about the second kind of population-size insensitivity,
exemplified by “individual risk” tests in environmental law or by the
closely analogous “area protection” criterion for natural hazards
which says that flood- or hurricane-prone communities must be
defended by physical structures, relocated, or otherwise protected so
that the risk of harm to anyone in the community is reduced to some
cutoff? These approaches seem hard to justify. On the one hand, the
agency is told to consider policy effects in mitigating hazard impacts
along some welfare dimension(s). Yet the agency is also instructed to
ignore the number of individuals who would be benefited by the
policy. Why expect that the institutional benefits of this relatively
modest truncation of the analysis will be substantial?
To be more concrete, let us imagine that cost-benefit analysis has
proven too elastic and manipulable in the hands of ACE, and that the
agency is best instructed to focus on safety. “Choose protective
measures for flood- or hurricane-prone settlements so as to minimize
safety risks.” That directive could be specified in population-sizeinsensitive terms (“Ensure that flooding will not occur in any settled
area, except in the X-year flood”), or in size-sensitive terms (“Ensure
that the expected number of annual deaths from flooding in any given
community is below D**”). D** could be one, or it could be a
number keyed to the average costs of building levees in many
communities.
Both the size-insensitive technique and the size-sensitive
technique require the levee designer to estimate the frequency of
floods and hurricanes of various magnitudes, and the efficacy of
different policies in preventing flood or hurricane waters from
reaching the settlement. The latter technique requires, in addition,
that the system designer consider how many individuals reside in the
settlement, and how many are likely to die if it is flooded. Given the
current state of our information about population patterns and our
models for predicting population impacts, the institutional costs of
this incremental step would seem to be pretty small.
D. Do Not Use Arbitrary Non-Zero Numerical Cutoffs
Environmental policy analysis frequently uses non-zero
numerical cutoffs, particularly in specifying “individual risk” tests.
When regulatory intervention to mitigate some toxin or radiation
source is keyed to the incremental “individual risk” incurred by the
maximally exposed individual or someone else in the exposure
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distribution, it becomes crucial to specify what the relevant
“individual risk” level is. In the case of carcinogens, different levels
are used, depending on the agency and program. The most frequent
cutoffs are incremental lifetime fatality risks of one in one million,
one in one hundred thousand, one in ten thousand or one in one
88
thousand (the last, used by OSHA).
Noncarcinogens are treated differently. Why? By contrast with
carcinogens, noncarcinogens are traditionally believed to have a
toxicity threshold: a dose level below which the noncarcinogen will
not cause harm. But non-zero cutoffs creep into policy analysis, even
here—given uncertainty about what the threshold level for a
particular noncarcinogen is. Imagine that an environmental agency
aims to bring the maximally exposed individual or some other person
in the exposure distribution below his toxicity threshold, but also
wishes to avoid the massive costs of requiring zero exposure. Then it
will need to employ some non-zero cutoff to specify an acceptable
degree of uncertainty about whether the relevant individual is above
the toxicity threshold—because at any exposure above zero, the
agency cannot be completely certain that the threshold is not
exceeded. In practice, programs that regulate noncarcinogens
typically take the NOAEL observed in rodent experiments—the level
of the toxin that produces no observed incremental frequency of
death—and then divide that by some safety factor (ten, one hundred,
or one thousand) to estimate a “reference” level of the
noncarcinogen. These safety factors are non-zero cutoffs that are
meant to ensure a high—but not complete—degree of certainty that
the relevant individual is below his toxicity threshold.89
Natural hazards policymakers also use cutoffs. As we have seen,
various criteria require policymakers to protect against natural hazard
events up to some extreme point. Sometimes, the extreme point is set
at some non-zero number. The National Flood Insurance Program is
90
structured around the one hundred-year flood. Earthquake codes
are often designed to avoid building collapse in a 475-year
91
earthquake.
Sometimes, the extreme point is set with reference to the
probable maximum event. Levees are sometimes built to withstand
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Adler, supra note 8, at 1147–79.
See id. at 1161–65.
See sources cited supra note 81.
See Bommer, supra note 58, at 60.
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the “standard project flood” or “probable maximum flood.” “The
SPF discharge in a river represents the flow that can be expected from
the most severe combination of meteorologic and hydrologic
conditions reasonably characteristic of the geographic region
92
involved.” Similarly, structures might be strengthened to resist the
“probable maximum earthquake.”93 The probable maximum event
94
represents a kind of zero risk level. If the causal laws governing
floods or hurricanes are deterministic, then it is intelligible to try to
identify a maximal event—an event that cannot be exceeded at a
given location, given those causal laws—and to design to that. But
even here, non-zero numerical cutoffs may creep in, given our
uncertainty about the causal laws or about the strength of
structures—just as non-zero cutoffs creep into the regulation of
noncarcinogens via the “safety factors.” For example, an agency
decisionmaker told to design, or specify regulations for, a class of
structures sufficient to ensure that they survive the probable
maximum event might be told that he should be 95 percent certain of
survival.95
Non-zero cutoffs may be justifiable. First, it is possible that weakwelfarist morality itself incorporates non-zero cutoffs. Overall wellbeing does not. If a given person is benefited or harmed, even a little
bit, by some event or policy, then overall well-being goes up or down
too. Any positive or negative change in how some individual fares
with respect to some welfare dimension can change that individual’s
well-being; any positive or negative change to an individual’s wellbeing can change overall well-being. Zero is the natural threshold for
purposes of the overall-welfare construct.
But equity may have non-zero cutoffs. For example, a thresholdbased conception of equity—one that seeks to bring individuals above
“poverty lines,” representing minimum levels of achievement with
respect to different well-being dimensions—contains non-zero cutoffs,
namely the levels of the thresholds. Some specifications of moral

92. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., supra note 82, at 60.
93. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING LOSSES FROM FUTURE EARTHQUAKES
20–25 (1989); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS, supra note 59, at 61–63; Bommer,
supra note 58.
94. See Moser, supra note 59, at 2.
95. Cf. FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 139–58 (describing levee
certification criteria that look to 0.90 or 0.95 probability of passing the one hundred-year flood);
Ellingwood, supra note 52, at 259 (suggesting 0.90 probability of surviving the five hundred-year
earthquake as a possible goal for building design).
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rights, too, involve non-zero cutoffs. Deontological theorists who
recognize a right not to be exposed to risk might conceivably specify
96
that as a right not to be exposed to a high risk.
Second, it is possible that non-zero cutoffs may be justifiable on
institutional grounds. For example, a commission might perform a
cost-benefit analysis for a sample of toxic waste dumps; ascertain
which remedial standard R* (defined in terms of “individual risk” to
the maximally exposed individual) maximizes the net benefits of
cleaning up all the dumps; and then advise that the cleanup agency be
instructed to use that R* in performing its cleanups (not trusting the
agency to do cost-benefit analysis of individual waste sites).
In point of fact, however, the actual “individual risk” numbers
employed by environmental policy agencies—one in one million, one
in one hundred thousand, one in ten thousand, one in one thousand—
97
seem to be pretty arbitrary. As far as I am aware, neither the
agencies that use these cutoffs nor academics have persuasively
defended these particular numbers as either corresponding to morally
fundamental cutoffs, or as the numbers that optimize overall wellbeing (or equity or rights) across a range of administrative programs.
One might similarly worry about the arbitrariness of the nonnumerical cutoffs employed in natural hazards policymaking. The one
hundred-year recurrence interval, central to the National Flood
Insurance Program, was apparently set in an intuitive way, without
98
any systematic analysis. As for the return intervals used for seismic
design:
[T]he almost universal use of the 475-year return period in [seismic]
codes can be traced back to the hazard study for the USA produced
by Algermissen and Perkins, which was based on an exposure period
of 50 years (a typical design life) and a probability of 10% of
exceedance, whose selection has not been explained. . . . A review of
seismic design regulations around the world reveals a host of design
return periods, the origin of which is rarely if ever explained. [One
set of g]uidelines specify 500 years for “essential” bridges, 2500 years
for “critical” bridges. In [another] proposal for a framework for
performance-based seismic design, return periods of 72, 244, 475 and

96. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1227–32.
97. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Discernible Risk—A Proposed Standard for Significant
Risk in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 78–80 (1991).
98. See FLOOD DAMAGE REDUCTION STUDIES, supra note 6, at 142–43.
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974 years have been specified . . . . It is hard not to feel that some of
99
these values have been almost pulled from a hat . . . .

E. Do Not Conflate Moral Rights Infringements with Welfare
Setbacks (Even to Vital Interests)
Some of the scholarly literature on environmental policy seems
to take the view that virtually any death or injury resulting from an
100
environmental hazard implicates moral rights. Such a view is
problematic.
Deontological accounts of policymaking face the general
difficulty of explaining why government has a deontological reason to
101
Very plausibly, if
prevent rights infringements by others.
government itself builds an inadequate levee without informing the
exposed population, then it has committed a deontological wrong and
has a deontological obligation to repair the levee. But consider the
case in which private developers in Mississippi, knowing of the
hurricane risk, build inadequate buildings without informing the
occupants. If Matt Adler, a private citizen of Mississippi, is aware of
these events but declines to bear private costs to warn the occupants,
he has not deontologically wronged the occupants. He has simply
failed to perform the supererogatory action of rescuing them. Why,
then, is the government of Mississippi or the United States
deontologically obliged to take steps to help the occupants—thereby
imposing costs on the private citizens of Mississippi or the United
States which, individually, they would have no deontological
obligation to bear?
This is a general problem, and may well have a satisfying general
answer. But even if it does, at most the answer would show that
government has a deontological duty of some kind to stop
deontological rights violations by private actors. This is not the same
as a deontological duty to stop all harms. A harm or expected harm—
an actual or expected setback to some aspect of well-being—is not
sufficient for a rights violation. Harms or expected harms will be

99. Bommer, supra note 58, at 60–61 (internal citations omitted); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SAFETY OF DAMS, supra note 59, at 23 (noting use of arbitrary criteria in
designing dams, such as an arbitrary percentage of the one hundred-year flood or the probable
maximum flood).
100. See, e.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 117–18 (1991).
101. See Adler, supra note 8, at 1224–25.
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rights invasions only if there are wrongdoers. Identifying wrongdoers
in the case of natural hazards is particularly tricky, because a large
part of the causal chain leading to harm will be some meteorological
or seismic event rather than a human action. Of course, humans will
sometimes be wrongdoers here; humans can wrongfully make others
more vulnerable to hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and so on. On the
other hand, there will be cases—at a minimum, cases where the
harmed parties knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of a
natural hazard—in which the harm or expected harm of a natural
hazard violates no rights.
Specifying these cases more fully involves an account of
deontological wrongdoing—a controversial matter that I cannot
102
engage at any length here. But it seems quite clear that all
deontologists, whatever their particular accounts, would strongly
resist conflating the category of harm or expected harm (even to a
very important interest, such as life) with the category of rights
infringement.
II. RISK ASSESSMENT
The main thrust of Part I was that policy analysis for
environmental and natural hazards should be welfare-focused,
multidimensional, and sensitive to population size at some level.
Policy analysis is welfare-focused if it directly attends to the impact of
possible policies on human interests, rather than employing some
proxy criterion. It is multidimensional if it attends to the full range of
human interests, rather than giving priority to one or a few. It is
sensitive to population size if it makes reference to the number of
individuals harmed by hazards. Administrative decision procedures
that do not fulfill these desiderata may be justifiable, but only on
institutional grounds, if the procedures are sufficiently accurate in
tracking overall well-being, equity, and rights, and if the decision costs
and bureaucratic error rates of welfare-focused, multidimensional,
and size-sensitive procedures are too high.
Further, in the case where agencies justifiably employ truncated
procedures, the locus of welfare-focused, multidimensional, and
population-size-sensitive decisionmaking is simply shifted to some
other decisionmaker or advisor: from agencies to Congress or the

102. For further discussion, see Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994).
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President, or from Congress and the President to governmental
commissions, think tanks, and scholars.
These points have much relevance for risk assessment. It is
critical to develop and maintain risk assessment techniques that can
subserve welfare-focused, multidimensional, and population-sizesensitive policy analysis for environmental and natural hazards—if
not to inform agency decisionmakers, then at least to inform their
overseers, or the individuals who advise the overseers. Further, risk
assessments can be more or less simplified—meaning that they may
ignore relevant scientific data, employ simplified models, or adopt a
simplified approach to the treatment of uncertainty. Simplified
assessments may, in principle, be justifiable—on the now-familiar
grounds of decision cost and bureaucratic error—but should be
critically scrutinized.
A. Develop Techniques Suitable for Multidimensional, PopulationSize-Sensitive Policy Analysis
A risk assessment is a characterization of the harms that an
environmental or natural hazard can be expected to cause, either in
the status quo or in the event that various mitigating interventions are
adopted. Proxy-based policy-analytic criteria may not necessitate a
risk assessment. Policy-analytic criteria that focus on one dimension
of well-being will require a risk assessment only with respect to that
dimension. Policy-analytic criteria that are insensitive to population
size will not require a risk assessment that estimates the total amount
of harm caused by a hazard. But, because environmental and natural
hazards decisionmaking should be welfare-focused, multidimensional,
and sensitive to population size at some level, risk assessment
techniques to inform that sort of policy analysis need to be
maintained and improved. The cautionary lesson, here, is directed at
the risk assessment community—in effect, at those who maintain a
certain kind of intellectual capital, namely the scholars who develop
risk assessment techniques and the agencies or other bodies which
fund that scholarly work.
To begin, the safety-focused conception of environmental risk
assessment needs to be broadened to encompass a fuller range of
harms. The Red Book framework says that a “risk assessment” means
“the characterization of the potential adverse health effects of human
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exposures to [an] environmental hazard[],” encompassing a hazard
identification, a dose-response assessment, and an exposure
assessment, all leading up to a risk characterization (that is, a
characterization of individual or population fatality and health risks).
This remains the standard framework for conceptualizing risk
assessment of toxins and radiation.104
It might be thought that this conception is adequate for
environmental hazards—that non-safety impacts occur as a result of
policies to mitigate environmental hazards (for example, when
regulations impose economic costs on shareholders, workers, and
consumers), rather than being caused by the hazards themselves. This
is not true: toxins and radiation causally impact a variety of human
interests other than health and longevity, for example, by causing
smells, poor visibility, physical damage to property, loss of property
value, and the degradation of recreational and other “use” values
attendant upon ecosystem harm.
In any event, the safety-focused conceptualization, or any
unidimensional conceptualization, is too narrow for purposes of
natural hazards risk assessment. As already stated, natural hazards
causally impact a wide range of human interests, and the natural
hazards risk assessment community needs to develop models and
techniques to characterize all those types of impacts. Much work has
been done on quantifying the economic effects of natural hazards—
both direct property damage and more indirect effects, such as
business interruption or macroeconomic effects. This includes ACE’s
efforts and that of many scholars. Substantial scholarly work has also
been undertaken to estimate the deaths and injuries caused by natural
hazards.105 “HAZUS,” a computer program for earthquake,

103. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
supra note 3, at 18 (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Paustenbach, supra note 19, at 7–9; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE
AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 4–5 (1994).
105. On ACE practices, see supra note 6. For scholarship concerning the estimation of
losses caused by natural hazards, including economic losses, injuries and casualties and (to some
extent) other losses as well, see, for example, ECONOMICS AND THE WIND, supra note 40; FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, INDIRECT ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A CATASTROPHIC
EARTHQUAKE (1992); FLOODS AND LANDSLIDES, supra note 2; NAT’L INST. OF BLDG. SCIS.,
supra note 2; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A
CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE (1992); José Badal et al., Preliminary Quantitative Assessment of
Earthquake Casualties and Damages, 34 NAT. HAZARDS 353 (2005); 13 EARTHQUAKE
SPECTRA 565 (1997); J.W. Hall et al., A Methodology for National-Scale Flood Risk Assessment,
156 WATER & MAR. ENGINEERING 235 (2003); Penning-Rowsell et al., supra note 79.
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hurricane, and flood risk assessment developed by FEMA for
distribution to states, localities, and the private sector, allows some
estimation of physical damage (“damage to residential and
commercial buildings, schools, critical facilities, and infrastructure”),
economic loss (“lost jobs, business interruptions, repair and
reconstruction costs”), and certain “social impacts” (“estimates for
106
shelter requirements,” “displaced households” and casualties). Risk
assessment techniques to quantify a broader range of “social impacts”
of natural hazards—such as psychological trauma, destruction of
cultural heritage, family separation, or the disruption of schooling—
would also be useful.107
A second cautionary lesson concerns population-size
insensitivity. Particular policy-analytic criteria may ignore some
welfare dimension entirely, or may attend to that dimension in a sizeinsensitive manner (for example, through an “individual risk” test).
But, ideally, risk assessment techniques should be available to predict
aggregate losses with respect to the variety of welfare dimensions that
environmental and natural hazards do causally impact.
Risk assessment of noncarcinogens dramatically illustrates the
point. Because these substances have been thought to possess a
threshold below which no harm will ensue, risk assessment techniques
here have been traditionally focused on estimating that threshold—
specifically, on identifying the NOAEL—and not on providing
quantitative estimates of “individual risk” or total deaths.
For many years, there has been a fundamental dichotomy in risk
assessment. Since the 1970s, the potential carcinogenic hazards of
chemicals have generally been characterized by quantitative
estimates of the increased lifetime risk of cancer associated with a
given exposure. On the other hand, the potential hazards of
chemicals for toxic endpoints other than cancer have generally been

106. HAZUS: FEMA’s Software Program for Estimating Potential Losses from Disasters,
supra note 7. The precise capabilities of HAZUS depend on whether the hazard being
evaluated is an earthquake, flood or hurricane. FEMA’s web site, supra, provides links that
describe the earthquake, flood and hurricane components of HAZUS.
107. ACE’s report on the impact of Katrina is a good step in this direction. In addition to
characterizing the economic consequences, human health and safety consequences, and
environmental consequences of the hurricane, it also characterizes social and cultural
consequences. See generally 7 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, supra note 82.
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characterized only by the specification of an exposure level
108
considered to be without appreciable risk . . . .

The upshot is that no consensus technique currently exists for
estimating the total deaths or diseases caused by exposures to
109
noncarcinogens.
This lacuna in risk assessment techniques does not undermine
certain policy-analytic criteria. For example, the estimation of the
NOAEL is sufficient information for a decisionmaker who seeks to
reduce the exposure of the maximally exposed individual to a level
equaling the NOAEL divided by some safety factor. But the lacuna
does undermine cost-benefit analysis or other criteria that do require
information about total deaths or diseases. “[W]ithout readily
available means for quantifying noncancer risks, the focus [in costbenefit analysis] is often solely on cancer risks, while noncancer
110
health risks are ignored.” A good example is EPA’s cost-benefit
analysis for arsenic under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Arsenic at
low doses causes bladder and liver cancer, and also life-threatening
noncancer effects such as ischemic heart disease (ISHD). EPA
quantified the cancer reduction benefits of lowering the level of
arsenic in drinking water, but not the reduction in noncancer effects—
even though it appears that “the mortality risk of ISHD from drinking
water may be greater than the mortality risk from cancer.”111 The
agency’s “failure to quantify the noncancer effects of arsenic appears
to result from the fact that there is not a generally accepted practice,
or expectation, of performing low-dose extrapolation for noncancer
endpoints.”112
Fortunately, the NOAEL example appears to have no analogue
in natural hazards risk assessment. There appears to be no general
resistance to estimating aggregate effects with respect to some kind of
harm.

108. Harvey J. Clewell & Kenny S. Crump, Quantitative Estimates of Risk for Noncancer
Endpoints, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 285, 285 (2005).
109. See id. at 288.
110. Id. at 285.
111. Id. at 287.
112. Id. Another context in which NOAEL-type information would be inadequate is an
emergency response agency’s choice among different responses to a widespread toxic exposure.
Information about expected casualties would be crucial for this choice. See generally Kenneth T.
Bogen, Risk Analysis for Environmental Health Triage, 25 RISK ANALYSIS 1085 (2005).
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B. Do Not Exclude Relevant Information (AGIR)
Predicting the harm caused by a toxin or radiation means
combining an exposure assessment (describing how much of the toxin
or radiation various individuals receive) and a dose-response
assessment (predicting the incremental “individual risk” for a given
dose and a given type of individual). Environmental agencies have
often excluded relevant information at both these stages of risk
assessment.
First, at the exposure assessment stage, environmental agencies
tend to ignore some relevant social science data. The exposure of
humans to a dangerous substance contained in a waste dump or
emitted by a factory or nuclear plant depends not merely on hard
science (the physical laws governing the transport of the substance
through the air, ground, and water) but also on demographics (the
number of humans present at various distances from the dump,
factory, or plant). This is, of course, a point that environmental
agencies have recognized; but their demographic and, more generally,
social-scientific models have often been quite simplistic. For example,
a comprehensive review by the National Research Council of EPA’s
risk assessment techniques for air pollutants reached the following
conclusion:
EPA has not previously used population activity, population
mobility, and demographics in modeling exposure to hazardous air
pollutants and has not adequately evaluated the effects of assuming
that the population of a census enumeration district is all at the
location of the district’s population center.
EPA should use population-activity models in exposure
assessments when there is reason to believe that the exposure
estimate might be inaccurate . . . if the default option is applied. This
is particularly important in the case of potential underestimation of
risk. Population mobility and demographics will also play a role in
113
determining risk and lifetime exposures.

Second, at the dose-response assessment stage, environmental
agencies tend to ignore personal characteristics. A repeated theme in
commission reports and the academic literature is that environmental
agencies should consider employing dose-response models that reflect

113. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 104, at 139.
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heterogeneity in individual susceptibility to toxins—be it because of
114
age, gender, health history, or identifiable genetic factors.
Ignoring relevant data is one way to simplify risk assessment.
Simplification has potential benefits (in lower decision costs and
bureaucratic error), but also costs (in producing inaccurate risk
assessments). Those who design agency risk assessment techniques,
and the scholars who advise the designers, need to try to balance
these costs and benefits. Substantial scholarly commentary suggests
that the risk assessment techniques currently employed by
environmental agencies are unjustifiably abstemious in their use of
relevant data.115
Social science data is, of course, crucial to natural hazards risk
assessment. The term often used in the literature is population
“vulnerability”: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, droughts, tornadoes,
and avalanches harm humans because of an interaction between a
natural event and a human population that is “vulnerable,” to some
extent, to that event. Vulnerability is a matter of social, not physical,
science. And, just as individuals are heterogeneous in their
susceptibility to toxins, so they are heterogeneous in their
vulnerability to natural hazards—a point that the natural hazards
literature stresses.
A major approach to hazards research over the past two decades
has looked at the way in which a variety of socioeconomic
characteristics of people affect . . . their vulnerability to hazards and
disasters over time. . . .
In the United States the key characteristics that seem to influence
disaster vulnerability most are socioeconomic status, gender, and
race or ethnicity. Differences in these characteristics result in a
complicated system of stratification of wealth, power, and status.
This stratification, in turn, results in an uneven distribution of
exposure and vulnerability to hazards, disaster losses, and other

114. See, e.g., id. at 188–223; Adler, supra note 8, at 1145 n.86 (citing sources).
115. See, e.g., 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT
AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY
DECISION-MAKING 71–85 (1997); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN
RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 104, at 138–40, 218–19; Adam M. Finkel, A Quantitative Estimate
of the Variations in Human Susceptibility to Cancer and Its Implications for Risk Management, in
LOW-DOSE EXTRAPOLATION OF CANCER RISKS: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 297 (Stephen Olin
et al. eds., 1995); Lauren Zeise et al., Improving Risk Assessment: Research Opportunities in
Dose Response Modeling to Improve Risk Assessment, 8 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 1421, 1423–30 (2002).

01__ADLER.DOC

2006]

11/14/2006 8:29 AM

NATURAL HAZARD POLICY ANALYSIS

43

impacts and access to aid, recovery, and reconstruction. For
example, the poor are more likely to occupy old and more
hazardous housing, ethnic minorities are less likely to receive
disaster warnings and are more likely to have language barriers to
the information they receive, and developing nations are less able to
afford disaster detection technology and resilient construction
116
practices.

Worries about undue simplification are just as relevant for
natural hazards as for environmental risk assessment. An important
example involves the endogeneity of human activity to risk reduction
measures. Salient measures to decrease the impacts of a natural
hazard in some location, such as levees or other visible structural
measures, can reduce the perceived risks in that location and thus
induce increased settlement or building. Individuals may respond to
enhanced government protection from natural hazards with
“compensatory” behaviors that reduce the protection, thereby
producing a smaller reduction in death, property loss, and other harm
than would occur absent “compensation.”117 ACE needs to be
sensitive to these points in undertaking cost-benefit analyses of flood
118
reduction measures.
C. Use Probabilistic Rather than Deterministic Risk Assessment
(AGIR)
The models, parameters, and other inputs that the risk assessor
uses to predict the impacts of environmental and natural hazards—on
119
safety or other human interests—will typically be uncertain.
Bracketing institutional considerations, this uncertainty should be
120
represented through a probability distribution. An alternative is to
use a “point value” for the uncertain input: for example, picking the

116. MILETI, supra note 5, at 122–23.
117. See Nicole Cornell Sadowski & Daniel Sutter, Natural Hazards, Fatality Rates and
Societal Vulnerability, in ECONOMICS AND THE WIND, supra note 40, at 149.
118. Cf. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 6, at 55–59 (discussing ACE’s traditional
preference for structural rather than nonstructural flood control measures); WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING, supra note 6, at 61–63 (same).
119. On uncertainty and risk assessment, see, for example, VINCENT T. COVELLO & MILEY
W. MERKHOFER, RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS: APPROACHES FOR ASSESSING HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 203–37 (1993); Pamela R.D. Williams & Dennis J. Paustenbach, Risk
Characterization, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 336, 336–45.
120. See, e.g., Dennis J. Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How
Others Can Benefit, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 318–19 (1995).
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most likely model, or the mean of a model parameter. The problem
with this approach is twofold. First, using “point values” rather than
probability distributions as inputs to risk assessments suppresses some
of the uncertainty about the output of the assessment, thereby
121
depriving the policy analyst of information that may be useful. For
example, imagine that the total deaths D from an earthquake in a
given location is a function of X, Y, and Z. If X, Y, and Z are all
assigned point values equaling their means, then D = F(X, Y, Z) is a
122
point value too. Uncertainty about the distribution of D is not
communicated to the decisionmaker. This may well be relevant
information, depending on how the policy-analytic criterion is
structured. For example, it is conceivable that overall welfare, and
policy-analytic criteria that implement overall welfare, are not “riskneutral” in the number of deaths. A very-low-probability, very-highconsequence earthquake that has a 0.01 percent annual probability
and would cause one million deaths may be worse for expected
overall welfare (and merit greater ex ante mitigation efforts) than a
higher-probability, lower-consequence earthquake that has a 10
percent annual probability and would cause one thousand deaths,
even though both seismic hazards have the same expected number of
annual deaths (one hundred).
Second, even if the policy-analytic criteria are risk-neutral in the
output of the risk assessment—so that the output distribution can,
without loss of relevant information, be summarized as its expected
value—using point values rather than probability distributions as
123
inputs to the risk assessment may generate incorrect results.
Although it is true that the expectation of the sum of random
variables is the sum of their expectations, it is not generally true that
the expectation of some arbitrary function of random variables is that
function applied to their expectations.
Indeed, so-called “probabilistic” risk assessment—which
characterizes uncertainties in inputs and outputs using probability
distributions, as opposed to “deterministic” assessment, which uses
point estimates—has been the focus of much scholarly work in recent

121. See Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, On the Value of Formal Assessment of
Uncertainty in Regulatory Analysis (Feb. 2006), at 8–11 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
122. And if X is assigned a point value equaling its mean, but Y and Z are represented as
random variables, the probability distribution of D may not be the same as if X were also
represented as a random variable.
123. See Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 121, at 8–11.
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years. However, environmental agencies have often been resistant to
“probabilistic” risk assessment. An exemplary case is EPA’s
treatment of model uncertainty in drawing dose-response curves for
carcinogens. Many substances are possible rather than clear
carcinogens, given existing epidemiological and experimental
evidence. In other words, there is a nontrivial probability that they
cause cancer but also a nontrivial probability that they don’t—that
their dose-response curves are flat lines. And, even if carcinogenicity
is quite clear, there may be much uncertainty about which particular
form the dose-response relationship takes. EPA has traditionally
refrained from quantifying uncertainty about carcinogenicity and
about the dose-response functional form. Instead, its approach has
been to use one particular model (the linearized multistage model)
for predicting fatalities from toxins that, as a qualitative mater, are
judged sufficiently likely to be carcinogens.124
Natural hazards risk assessment should, to some extent, employ
“probabilistic” rather than “deterministic” techniques. Indeed, ACE
has been considerably more receptive to “probabilistic” risk
assessment than EPA.125 To be sure, decision costs remain an
important reason for limiting the use of probabilistic techniques. It
may well be cheaper to estimate a point value for some input than to
trace a probability distribution. On the other hand, advances in
computers and software—in particular, the development of so-called
Monte Carlo techniques—have made it much easier to determine the
output of “probabilistic” risk assessments, i.e., to determine the
probability distribution that results from any given function of input
random variables. Further, as Judson Jaffe and Robert Stavins
observe:
[C]haracterizations of uncertainty may be necessary just to develop
an accurate point estimate for an input. If a point estimate
represents an input’s expected value, the development of that point
estimate requires an implicit judgment about that input’s probability
distribution. Characterizations of uncertainty . . . simply make those
126
implicit judgments explicit.

124. On EPA practices, see Adler, supra note 8, at 1148 n.91 (citing sources). The possibility
of quantifying model uncertainty is an important theme in the literature on Bayesian
approaches to risk assessment. See id. at 1209 & n.330.
125. See sources cited supra note 6; Moser, supra note 59; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
supra note 80.
126. Jaffe & Stavins, supra note 121, at 18.
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Because estimating a point value of some item given uncertainty
always involves some kind of probabilistic assessment, if only
qualitative or implicit rather than quantitative and explicit, the
incremental decision costs of a quantitative representation will often
not be large. Professors Jaffe and Stavins’ observation also suggests
that “probabilistic” risk assessment may actually be less subject to
agency manipulation. Explicitly articulating a probability distribution
would seem to be more transparent to agency overseers than making
a judgment about the mean or most likely value of an item without
articulating the distribution.
A different reason for the traditional resistance to “probabilistic”
risk assessment goes deep into the theory of probability and statistics.
Traditional statistical methods are “frequentist” rather than
“Bayesian.” They refuse to employ probabilities as measures of
beliefs; instead, probabilities are seen as solely representing objective
frequencies. On this view, it would be appropriate to represent the
occurrence of cancer in an individual as a random variable. With
some objective long-run frequency, individuals exposed to a given
dose of a toxin develop cancer—a frequency that can be estimated
using sampling techniques. On the other hand, traditional statisticians
would refuse to assign a probability to one or another model of
carcinogenicity. Imagine that the risk assessor is unsure whether the
toxin produces cancer by means of genotoxicity or some other
mechanism. Because there is no objective frequency here—in reality,
the substance is either genotoxic or not—attaching a “probability” to
genotoxicity is meaningless on the frequentist account.
For reasons I have explored at length elsewhere, an exclusively
frequentist account of probability is problematic in the domain of
127
policy analysis. Beliefs, like objective frequencies, can be quantified
probabilistically. Further, beliefs (and not just objective frequencies)
are a crucial input to risk assessment. The notion of using merely
frequency information to make predictions is chimerical. For
example, EPA’s dose-response procedures combine frequency data
(the frequency with which rats exposed to different doses of a
substance incur cancer) and expert beliefs (the belief that the
substance is a likely carcinogen and that, based on all the evidence to
date, the linearized multistage model is a plausible model of dose-

127.

See Adler, supra note 8, at 1183–239.
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response relationships). So expert beliefs are part of the picture—they
are simply not represented probabilistically.
To be sure, in some cases, experts may disagree, or may have
difficulty expressing their uncertainty as a probability distribution.
These phenomena represent a kind of decision cost, which may well
argue for “deterministic” rather than “probabilistic” approaches for
handling particular uncertain items. The point I wish to make is that
risk assessors should not be globally resistant to employing
probabilities as measures of beliefs. However appropriate a wholly
frequentist approach to probability and statistics may be for scientific
inquiry, it is too abstemious for policy analysis.
D. Do Not Adopt a Global Posture of “Conservatism” in Handling
Uncertainty
EPA has historically employed a “conservative” approach to risk
assessment.
The agency’s [risk assessment principles] are for the most part
intended to be conservative—that is, they represent an implicit
choice by the agency, in dealing with competing plausible
assumptions, to use (as default options) the assumptions that lead to
risk estimates that, although plausible, are believed to be more likely
to overestimate than to underestimate the risk to human health and
the environment. EPA’s risk estimates thus are intended to reflect
the upper region of the range of risks suggested by current scientific
128
knowledge.

One well-known example is the use of the linearized multistage doseresponse model, which is linear at low doses (rather than being
sublinear or having a threshold) and is “one of the most conservative
of the dose extrapolation models.”129 Another is EPA’s frequent use
of an upper bound estimate on the slope of this line, rather than the
maximum likelihood estimate, as the number employed to generate
130
predictions of individual and population risks. Other important
examples are the assumptions that “[h]umans are as sensitive as the
most sensitive animal species, strain, or sex evaluated in a bioassay”;
128. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 104, at 89.
129. Williams & Paustenbach, supra note 119, at 313.
130. See Lorenz R. Rhomberg, A Survey of Methods for Chemical Health Risk Assessment
Among Federal Regulatory Method Agencies, 3 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1029,
1100–02 (1997).
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that “benign and malignant tumors are added in evaluating whether a
chemical is carcinogenic and in assessing its potency”; and that
“[w]hen extrapolating metabolic data from laboratory animals to
humans, one may use the relationship of surface area [not body
weight] in the test species to that in humans in modifying the
131
laboratory animal data.”
In thinking about “conservatism,” it is important to distinguish
between “conservatism” at the level of policy analysis and
“conservatism” in the preparation of risk assessments. Policy-analytic
techniques, themselves, may be justifiably “conservative,” in the sense
that they may appropriately incorporate an ancillary instruction to
handle uncertainty about inputs by employing conservative rather
than central-tendency estimates. It is hard to see why this would be
true of cost-benefit analysis, but it may be true of other criteria. For
example, it is possible that institutional considerations justify natural
hazards agencies in employing criteria that make reference to
extreme events: “Ensure that building codes prevent collapse except
in the 475-year earthquake,” or “Build levees to prevent flooding in
cities except in the probable maximum flood.” Those same
institutional considerations could, in principle, mean that the agency
is justifiably instructed to employ upper bound estimates in estimating
the size of the extreme event or the adequacy of measures to contain
it. Why assume that the appropriate instruction is “Design a structure
that has a 0.50 probability of surviving the X-year flood or
earthquake,” rather than “Design a structure that has a 0.95
probability of surviving the X-year flood or earthquake”?
It is therefore difficult to make general statements about the
appropriate degree of conservatism for policy-analytic criteria. By
contrast, the question of the appropriate conservatism of risk
assessment is easier to resolve. If uncertainty about an input item is
represented probabilistically, as a random variable, the answer seems
easy: use Monte Carlo techniques to combine this input random
variable with other inputs, producing an output probability
distribution (of total deaths, property loss, trauma, and so forth)

131. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra
note 104, at 88–89.
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which the policy-analytic technique can incorporate together with
132
whatever rule for handling uncertainty it employs.
The more difficult issue arises when uncertainty about some
input isn’t represented probabilistically—when a “point estimate”
rather than a probability distribution for that input is used. Here, we
should distinguish between the case where a risk assessment of a
hazard is performed apart from any particular policy choice, and the
case where it is performed as part and parcel of policy analysis. In the
latter case, the answer to whether point estimates should be
“conservative” or rather central tendencies (or, for that matter, anticonservative) is straightforward: use whichever approach the policyanalytic technique demands. In the former case, risk assessment is
meant to provide generic information, for a variety of policy choices
and policy-analytic techniques—so the answer here is that risk
assessment should not merely use conservative values. It should also
inform the analyst what the hazard impact (or probability distribution
of impacts) would be if the point estimate for the input item were
estimated less conservatively.
In short, although the issues turn out to be complicated, it seems
clear that natural hazards risk assessment should eschew a general
preference for “conservative” estimates of the size of natural hazards
and of their impact on humans. The problem of conservatism can be
sidestepped by using probability distributions rather than point values
for uncertain quantities; and when point values are justifiably
employed (given decision costs), a global posture of estimating them
“conservatively” will produce risk assessments that are not useful for
policy-analytic criteria, such as cost-benefit analysis, that prefer
central-tendency estimates.
CONCLUSION
Environmental risk assessment and management is, in many
ways, an impressive accomplishment, but should not be reflexively
duplicated by natural hazards policymakers. This Article has
attempted to delineate the most important aspects of environmental
agencies’ decisionmaking practices that are problematic, or at least
demand an institutional justification—one that examines the decision

132. See Paustenbach, supra note 120, at 310 (“[T]he problems associated with the repeated
use of overly conservative assumptions . . . can now be overcome with Monte Carlo
techniques.”).
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costs, bureaucratic error rates, and accuracy (in tracking underlying
moral considerations) associated with different possible policyanalytic criteria. The suggestions here are supposed to be relatively
uncontroversial. They are meant to proceed from a relatively broadgauged moral framework—weak welfarism—which has room for
distributive considerations and moral rights, as well as overall wellbeing. Still, even placing to one side controversial moral questions
and difficult problems of optimal institutional design, it seems
possible to glean certain nontrivial cautionary lessons for natural
hazards policy analysis and risk assessment from the environmental
case. To summarize:
For Natural Hazards Policy Analysis
• Do Not Give Priority to Safety or Any Particular Aspect of
133
Well-Being (AGIR)
• Do Not Use Proxy Tests (AGIR)
• Do Not Ignore Population Size (AGIR)
• Do Not Use Arbitrary Non-Zero Numerical Cutoffs
• Do Not Conflate Moral Rights Infringements with Welfare
Setbacks (Even to Vital Interests)
For Natural Hazards Risk Assessment
• Develop Techniques Suitable for Multidimensional,
Population-Size-Sensitive Policy Analysis
• Do Not Exclude Relevant Information (AGIR)
• Use Probabilistic Rather than Deterministic Risk
Assessment (AGIR)
• Do Not Adopt a Global Posture of “Conservatism” in
Handling Uncertainty

133 “AGIR,” again, means “absent good institutional reason.” See supra text
accompanying note 36 (discussing role of institutional considerations in justifying policy-analytic
criteria).

